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Abstract: This article examines whether and how the moral principle of legal coherence
or integrity, which has recently been developed further as a response to disagreement in
the national legal context, applies to European law. According to the European integrity
principle, all national and European authorities should make sure their decisions cohere
with the past decisions of other European and national authorities that create and imple-
ment the law of a complex but single European legal order. Only by doing so, it is argued,
can the European political and legal community gain true authority and legitimacy in the
eyes of the European citizens to whom all these decisions apply. Although European
integrity is primarily a product of European integration, it has gradually become one of
the requirements of further integration. The article suggests that the principle of Euro-
pean integrity would help dealing with the growing pressure for common European solu-
tions under conditions of increasing diversity. It places disagreement at the centre of
European politics, as both an incentive and a means of integration by way of comparison
and self-reﬂectivity. It constitutes therefore the ideal instrument for a pluralist and ﬂexi-
ble further constitutionalisation of the European Union.
‘Leges sunt inventae quae cum omnibus semper una atque eadem voce loquerentur’.1
Introduction
Should the law ‘speak with just one voice’?2 This is what Cicero says in De Ofﬁciis and
it is also what many of us assume should be the case.3 In fact, our national legal 
practice seems, at ﬁrst sight at least, to conﬁrm this intuition. It sufﬁces to think of the
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1 Cicero, De Ofﬁciis, Loeb Classical Library (Heinemann and Harvard University Press, 1968) Liber 
secundus, at 42.
2 J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 1999) at 190.
3 See e.g. M. Poiares Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’, in 
N. Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart, 2003), who assumes that coherence is an essential quality
of any legal order.
principle of precedent or of analogical reasoning to see that the law already works so
as to preserve its overall coherence.4 As a result, many legal philosophers argue 
nowadays that the law should speak with one voice. Of course, they do not always use
these exact terms.5 Metaphors abound: some say that the law should ‘hang together’,6
while others speak of the law as a ‘tightly knit unit’.7 Despite terminological differ-
ences, these accounts are usually read as promoting the same political virtue and prin-
ciple: coherence, that is to say consistency in principle or, more famously, integrity, as
it is sometimes referred to since Ronald Dworkin’s provocative postulate in Law’s
Empire.8
According to Dworkin, even though citizens as political participants speak in dif-
ferent voices and are aware of their divisions on matters of justice, when individuals
act in the name of the political and legal community, they should, for that very reason,
always regard it as a moral demand to speak in just one voice.9 This applies even if the
single voice in which ofﬁcials speak does not always lead to what they individually
regard as just results.10 Integrity requires, in other words, that the laws and decisions11
they adopt as ofﬁcials,12 and hence that the state acts on, should be made to cohere as
much as possible with past laws and decisions in force (diachronic coherence), on the
one hand, and within themselves (synchronic coherence), on the other, as if they con-
veyed a single view of justice. Reasonable disagreements about justice and the princi-
ples governing fair decisions do not indeed guarantee that this will always be the case
naturally.13 Integrity may therefore be understood as a response to the pervasive fact
of disagreement in politics and the law, but also as being restricted by it, as it only
applies within the limits of the legal and political consequences of both moral and
social pluralism.14
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4 See K. Kress, ‘Coherence’, in D. Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Philoso-
phy (Blackwell, 1996) 533, 536.
5 See J. Dickson, ‘Interpretation and Coherence in Legal Reasoning’, in E. N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2001 Edition), at 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2001/entries/legal-reas-interpret/>, accessed 17 July 2003.
6 N. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Clarendon, 1978) and N. MacCormick, ‘Coherence
in Legal Justiﬁcation’, in A. Peczenik, H. Lindahl and B. Van Roermund (eds), Theory of Legal Science
(D. Reidel, 1984) 235.
7 A. Peczenik, The Basis of Legal Justiﬁcation (Lund, 1983).
8 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Fontana, 1986). Other theorists of legal coherence include: R. Alexy and 
A. Peczenik, ‘The concept of coherence and its signiﬁcance for discursive rationality’, (1990) 3:1 Ratio
Juris 130; S. Hurley, Natural Reasons (Oxford University Press, 1989); S. Hurley, ‘Coherence, Hypothet-
ical Cases, and Precedent’, (1990) 10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 221.
9 Dworkin, op. cit. note 8 supra, at 174. Note that although I use Dworkin’s conception as a starting point,
I am not defending a Dworkinian conception of European integrity.
10 Ibid. at 165.
11 In this article, ‘decisions’ refer, in a broad sense, to the different products of authorities’ deliberations,
such as legal norms, rules, or principles.
12 In this article, ‘ofﬁcials’ encompass legislators, executive ofﬁcers or judges and are not limited to the latter
as in other accounts of European coherence, such as Maduro, op. cit. note 3 supra or J. Bengoetxea,
N. MacCormick and L. Moral Soriano, ‘Integration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice’, in G. de Burca and J. Weiler (eds), The European Court of Justice (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2001) at 43. Note that some exceptions to the inter-institutional application of integrity
may have to be drawn to respect the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.
13 Dworkin, op. cit. note 8 supra, at 166, 273.
14 The conception of coherence defended here is therefore limited as opposed to ‘general’ conceptions of
legal coherence such as Dworkin’s. See J. Raz, ‘The Relevance of Coherence’, in Ethics in the Public
Domain (Clarendon, 1995) for a more limited account of coherence as a local virtue of some laws only.
But can this principle of coherence also apply to post-national law, and to European
law in particular?15 After all, the pluralism that characterises the multilayered legal
order in Europe,16 by contrast to unitary national legal orders, seems at ﬁrst sight at
least to contradict the possibility of legal coherence.17 As I will argue, however, nothing
prevents competing legal determinations in Europe from being made coherent if the
justiﬁcation and conditions of integrity are given in such a complex and pluralist legal
order.
Ever since its creation, the European Union has been oscillating between strong uni-
ﬁcation, on the one hand, and subsidiarity, on the other. As the European Union is
deeply pluralist and disagreement-ridden, however, none of these alternatives has been
in itself very promising. Uniﬁcation would undermine the ﬂourishing of a political
culture within Member States and subsidiarity would undermine it between them.18
Hence the attractiveness of a political virtue that would enable Europe to escape this
dualism between alienation and fragmentation. Integrity could do just that, as it would
help integrate further on issues that are part of European competence, without denying
the importance of disagreement and divergence of views between European and
national authorities on these matters. In fact, it could put disagreement at the centre
of the European construction, as both an incentive and a means of integration.
According to the European integrity principle, each jurisdiction or legislature in
Europe, be it European or national, would have to do more than just speak with a single
voice in its own legal order; it would have to try to do so in a way that is representa-
tive of the entire European political community’s expressed legal views, thus revealing
the true sense of constituting such a community in the face of diversity in Europe. With
this aim in mind, each authority should take into account past laws and decisions of
other European and national authorities and try to adjust its own laws and decisions
so as to make them ﬁt with the former as much as possible. In doing so, it would conﬁrm
that it is one of the many national and European authorities to create and apply the
law of a complex and pluralist but single European legal order.
Understood in these terms, integrity would ensure that European integration
amounts to a truly dynamic and cooperative project in which dialogue and mutual
learning receive a central role in constituting a European political community.19 This
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15 In the present article, the term ‘European law’ or ‘EU law’ refers to the law of the Treaties on the Euro-
pean Union, including the law of the European Community. Although in many cases, European law will
in fact be EC law, I will refer for reasons of clarity to European or EU law in general.
16 See on European legal pluralism, e.g. N. MacCormick, ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’, (1993) 56 Modern
Law Review 1 and N. Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’, (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317,
337 ff.
17 See K. Günther, ‘Rechtspluralismus und universaler Code der Legalität: Globalisierung als rechtstheo-
retisches Problem’, in L. Wingert and K. Günther (eds), Die Öffentlichkeit der Vernunft und die Vernunft
der Öffentlichkeit (Suhrkamp 2001) 539, 541. Note that I am assuming that it is possible to apply philo-
sophical concepts, which have been developed in the national context, to the European Union, provided
they are translated as this article proposes to do with the concept of integrity. See on this point, J. Shaw
and A. Wiener, ‘The Paradox of the ‘European Polity’ ’, in M. G. Green Cowles and M. Smith (eds),
Risks, Reform, Resistance and Revival, State of the European Union Series, Vol. 5 (Oxford University
Press, 2000) 64 on the ‘touch of stateness’ of the political and legal concepts we use to analyse European
law.
18 See A. Follesdal, ‘Subsidiarity and Democratic Deliberation’, in E. O. Eriksen and J. E. Fossum (eds),
Democracy in the European Union: Integration Through Deliberation? (Routledge, 2000) 85, 105.
19 See O. Gerstenberg, ‘Expanding the Constitution Beyond the Court: The Case of Euro-Constitutional-
ism’, (2002) 8 European Law Journal 172; O. Gerstenberg, ‘The new Europe: Part of the Problem or Part 
could prevent having, at the one end of the spectrum, a story of ‘constitutional self-
positioning’ on the part of European authorities20 or, at the other end, a story of
entrenchment of differences and sanctiﬁcation of local independence on the part of
national authorities.21 In this sense, integrity could become a useful vehicle for a pro-
gressive constitutionalisation of the European Union,22 and this even more so in the
context of the recent enlargement of the Union and of the increasing acknowledge-
ment of the degree of pluralism that characterises the European legal and political
order.
It remains to be established, however, whether and how such a post-national and
European principle and virtue of integrity can be justiﬁed and implemented in prac-
tice. The idea of European integrity is still very much unexplored, but for a few excep-
tions,23 and it is the point of the present article to examine it further. In a ﬁrst section,
I very brieﬂy present what I take to be the moral justiﬁcation for the principle of legal
integrity per se, before discussing in the next section the scope and limits of the prin-
ciple of European integrity itself. In the third section, I explore the extent to which the
main condition of integrity, i.e. the existence of a single political community whose
decisions should demonstrate coherence, applies to the European Union. The follow-
ing section addresses two potential preliminary difﬁculties with the principle of Euro-
pean integrity: sovereignty and authority. In the ﬁfth section, I present the different
forms European integrity can take depending on the type of authorities it applies to.
The last section provides three illustrations of how relevant the principle of European
integrity can be for the future of European integration.
I The Principle of Integrity per se
Before examining the principle of European legal integrity, it is important to assess the
moral justiﬁcation of the principle of legal integrity per se. More particularly, does the
principle resist to the point where speaking with one voice commands a result that is
European Law Journal Volume 10
260 © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004
of the Solution to the Problem’, (2002) 22 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 563; O. Gerstenberg and 
C. Sabel, ‘Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy: An Institutional Ideal for Europe?’, in R. Dehousse and 
C. Joerges (eds), Good governance and administration in Europe’s integrated market (Oxford University
Press, 2002).
20 See J. Weiler, ‘A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and Its Interlocutors’, (1994) 26:4
Comparative Political Studies 510, 515 ff. See also J. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, (1990–1991)
Yale Law Journal 2403, 2478 ff. on the opposition between ‘community’ and ‘unity’ in Europe.
21 See Follesdal, op. cit. note 18 supra, at 106.
22 On experimentalist approaches in the European context, see M. Dorf and C. Sabel, ‘A Constitution of
Democratic Experimentalism’, (1998) Columbia Law Review 267; J. Cohen and C. Sabel, ‘Sovereignty
and Solidarity: EU and US’, in J. Zeitlin and D. M. Trubek (eds), Governing Work and Welfare in a New
Economy: European and American Experiments (Oxford University Press, 2003) Ch. 13.
23 There is only a brief mention of the ‘general rule of integrity’ as part of the issue of legal pluralism in
M. La Torre, ‘Legal Pluralism as an Evolutionary Achievement of Community Law’, (1999) 12 Ratio
Juris 182, 193. See also the discussion of European coherence in M. Poiares Maduro, ‘Europe and the
Constitution: what if this is as good as it gets?’, in J. Weiler and M. Wind (eds), European Constitution-
alism beyond the State (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 74, 99–100. See, more recently, Maduro,
op. cit. note 3 supra, who does not, however, provide a detailed argument for the principle of coherence
he refers to as a basic principle presupposed by his account of constitutional pluralism and competitive
sovereignty in Europe. In their recent article, Bengoetxea, MacCormick and Moral Soriano, op. cit. note
12 supra refer to European integrity, but limit their discussion to an assessment of the legal reasoning of
the European Court of Justice. See, ﬁnally, Walker, op. cit. note 16 supra, at 335 ff. who mentions ‘inclu-
sive normative coherence’ as one of the criteria for a revised conception of constitutionalism in Europe.
regarded as unjust? Or, in a more practical vein, does it withstand the observation that
‘nothing in the way . . . law [is] produced guarantees [one’s] success in ﬁnding a coher-
ent conception of it’,24 since it amounts at the most to a ‘checkerboard’25 or ‘patch-
work’26 of disparate conceptions of justice left by different majorities at different
times?27
Integrity has become fashionable in legal and political philosophy ever since Dworkin
qualiﬁed it as the independent virtue of a true community of principle.28 But is there
really such a distinct and independent virtue of political integrity? It would go beyond
the scope of the present paper to assess the extremely complex claims that have been
made for and against integrity over the past twenty years.29 It is important, however,
to brieﬂy mention two main arguments for the justiﬁcation of an independent albeit
limited virtue of political integrity as they constitute this article’s premise.30
First, the argument of public morality. Integrity can be justiﬁed, in conditions of
widespread and persistent disagreement about justice, on grounds of an obligation of
public morality to respect others’ reasonable, albeit diverging, conceptions of what a
particular law should be in our political community.31 Of course, even if all this is
granted, the requirements of integrity may clash with the obligation to do what one
takes individually to be just. This may even lead, in extreme cases, to the rejection of
coherence on grounds of justice. These cases should, however, remain exceptional if
one wants to remain faithful to the idea of a respectful community in conditions of
widespread reasonable pluralism. There is a sense indeed in which it is because such
decisions are possible in some extreme cases only that integrity may be a virtuous atti-
tude to adopt in other cases.32
Second, the argument of authority. Legal integrity also amounts to a justiﬁed prin-
ciple, because we must be able to see ourselves as the authors of the political decisions
made by our authorities. Inconsistent rules cannot match pre-existing individual
reasons that tend to be coherent overall. Besides, they cannot enable a citizen to abide
by her reasons better than she would on her own.33 They cannot therefore be regarded
as binding law.
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24 See Raz, op. cit. note 14 above. See even Dworkin, op. cit. note 8 supra, at 166, 273, who voices this cri-
tique himself. Dworkin acknowledges therefore the existence of incoherence in existing law and regards
his own account as a heuristic one according to which past and present laws should be reconstructed in
order to be made coherent.
25 On this expression, see Dworkin, op. cit. note 8 supra, at 179.
26 On this expression, see Waldron, op. cit. note 2 supra, at 189.
27 This point was made most famously by R. Unger, What Should Legal Analysis Become? (Verso, 1996)
66.
28 Dworkin, op. cit. note 8 supra, at 176–177, 217.
29 See Kress, op. cit. note 4 supra for a complete attempt to do so. See also Dickson, op. cit. note 5 supra.
30 I have argued more extensively for the independence and the justiﬁcation of integrity elsewhere. See e.g.
S. Besson, ‘Four Arguments Against Compromising Justice Internally’, (2003) 2 Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 211, 233 ff.
31 See Waldron, op. cit. note 2 supra, at 188 ff. for a presentation of the circumstances of integrity, rather
than an argument for integrity itself.
32 See M. Weber, ‘Politics as Vocation’, in H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds), From Max Weber: Essays
in Sociology (Oxford University Press, 1991) at 127.
33 See on this account of authority, J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon, 1986) 53.
II The Principle of European Integrity
The principle of European integrity is best understood if one distinguishes its scope
from its limits. This ﬁrst presentation of the principle is intentionally brief and will be
ﬂeshed out in Section III, where the different forms that European integrity can take
in practice will be presented.
A The Scope of European Integrity
According to the European integrity principle propounded here, each jurisdiction or
legislature in Europe, be it European or national, should not be satisﬁed with speak-
ing with a single voice in its own legal order. This traditional form of integrity is what
is commonly referred to as horizontal coherence in the European context.34 Each author-
ity should indeed also try to speak in a way that is representative of the legally expressed
views in the entire European political community or polity, be it by European or
Member States’ authorities.35 This second form of integrity is also called vertical coher-
ence in the European context.36 Only on this condition can European law and the Euro-
pean legal order lato sensu, which encompasses European law stricto sensu, but also its
implementation and interpretation in national law and national law tout court, be said
to be the law of Europeans, the law of the European political and legal community as
a whole (Rechtsgemeinschaft in German) and not only of the European Community
itself.37
Coherence and continuity with past laws and objectives of the European Union is
already something that is required by Article 3 of the consolidated version of the Treaty
on the European Union (TEU). In other words, there is already a legal translation of
the principle of integrity in European law. It is important to examine, however, how
exactly this legal principle of integrity relates to what is taken to be required by the
moral principle of European integrity defended here.38 This way we should be able to
see how much can and should still be achieved by the independent moral virtue of
integrity in the European Union.
The scope of Article 3 TEU’s principle of coherence is controversial and its content
remains quite vague. This is largely because its wording is not consistent in the differ-
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34 See D. Curtin and I. Dekker, ‘The EU as a ‘layered’ international organisation: institutional unity in dis-
guise’, in P. Craig and G. De Burca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press, 1999) 83,
103; C. Tietje, ‘The concept of coherence in the Treaty on European Union and the Common Foreign
and Security Policy’, (1997) European Foreign Affairs Review 211, 224–231; N. Neuwahl, ‘Foreign and
Security Policy and the Implementation of the Requirement of ‘Consistency’ under the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union’, in D. O’Keeffe and P. M. Twomey (eds), Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (Chancery
Law Publishing, 1994) 227, 234–238. Note, however, that Maduro, op. cit. note 3 supra uses vertical and
horizontal coherence to distinguish respectively between coherence among European and national courts,
and coherence among national courts.
35 Note that, both at the national and European levels, past judicial decisions do not necessarily bind 
legislatures.
36 See Curtin and Dekker, op. cit. note 34 supra, at 103; Tietje, op. cit. note 34 supra, at 224–231; Neuwahl,
op. cit. note 34 supra, at 234–238.
37 See I. Pernice, ‘Der Beitrag Walter Hallstein zur Zukunft Europas—Begründung und Konsolidierung der
Europäischen Gemeinschaft als Rechtsgemeinschaft’,
<www.rewi.hu-berlin.de/WHI/deutsch/papers/whipapers901/index.htm>, accessed on 17 July 2003.
38 See F. Snyder, ‘Constitutional Law of the European Union’, in European Community Law, Collected
Courses of the Academy of European Law, Vol. VI: 1 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995) 41, 106 on
the legal, moral, and political dimensions of the issue of European law’s ‘effectiveness’.
ent linguistic versions of the Treaty; the English version refers to consistency and con-
tinuity and not to coherence as such, whereas the French version does. Surprisingly
enough, this linguistic inconsistency remains in the Convention on the Future of
Europe’s (CFE) Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe of 27 June 2003
(hereafter the Draft Constitution).39 In its Art I-18, the Draft Constitution speaks of
‘consistency’ in English, and of ‘cohérence’ in French, of the policies and actions under-
taken in the European single institutional framework by reference to the Union’s objec-
tives. Most commentators of Art 3 TEU consider, however, that ‘ “coherence” means
not only the absence of [logical] contradictions—often referred to as “consistency”—
but also the presence of positive connections [of principle] between different parts of
a legal system’.40 One may therefore legitimately assume that this interpretation will
also apply to Article I-18 of the Draft Constitution.41
Article 3 TEU’s principle of coherence consists mostly of horizontal coherence, but
some commentators argue that it also encompasses vertical coherence. The Treaty does
not provide any express general organisational rules so as to guarantee the respect of
the principle of coherence, other than the principle of a single institutional framework
and the special responsibility conferred on the Council and the Commission in that
respect (Article 3(2) TEU). All these refer mostly to horizontal coherence. However,
nothing excludes these rules from applying to vertical coherence in some cases that still
remain quite indeﬁnite. In this context, this would imply mostly coherence with national
decisions on the part of European authorities in the case of the implementation of a
European competence.42
According to the vertical dimension of the principle of European integrity proposed
in this article, all authorities should take into account past laws and decisions of other
European authorities, be they national or strictly European, and try to make their own
laws and decisions ﬁt with them as far as possible; indeed, these laws and decisions rep-
resent the European political community’s or polity’s views on issues that are often
heavily controversial and on which ofﬁcials should speak with one voice. This princi-
ple applies among European authorities and national authorities, but also among
national authorities that implement and interpret European law.43 To distinguish both
forms of vertical integrity, one could speak of vertical-vertical or supranational integrity
between European and national authorities, on the one hand, and of vertical-horizon-
tal or transnational integrity between national authorities, on the other. What remains
difﬁcult to assess is how far the legal principle of vertical coherence as it currently exists
in the European legal order applies not only to coherence on the part of national
authorities with European laws, but also to coherence on the part of European 
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39 All constitutional drafts may be retrieved on the CFE’s website: http://european-convention.eu.int.
40 Curtin and Dekker, op. cit. note 34 supra, at 89; Tietje, op. cit. note 34 supra, at 213. In this sense, the
European principle of integrity or coherence may be regarded as more precise and incisive than the exist-
ing European principle of loyalty (Art 10 EC); it requires an effort of horizontal and vertical convergence
of national and European laws and decisions rather than the general collaboration of national authorities
on European issues.
41 Of course, Art I-18’s interpretation may differ in the long run from Art 3 TEU’s, especially once the exist-
ing Treaties are replaced by a European Constitution, but for the time being there is no evidence of poten-
tial discrepancy.
42 See Curtin and Dekker, op. cit. note 34 supra, at 102.
43 See Weiler, 1994, op. cit. note 20 supra, at 521 on the increasing tendency to cooperate among national
authorities in the EU.
authorities with national implementations of European objectives and to national
authorities’ decisions, on the one hand, and to transnational coherence among national
decisions on matters of European competence, on the other.44
Article 14 of the Preliminary Draft Constitutional Treaty of 28 October 2002 seemed
to provide an answer to this question. It clearly indicated that the principle of coher-
ence applies equally to areas of European competence and to areas of national com-
petence, thus indicating that coherence should be ensured vertically by European and
by national authorities, be it supranationally or transnationally. These additional ele-
ments seem, however, to have been left out of the CFE’s last Draft Constitution’s Article
I-18. Nevertheless, one could argue that these elements have now been encompassed
among the duties of loyal cooperation stated in Article I-5.2 Draft Constitution. Article
I-5 deals with the relations between the Union and the Member States in general. More
particularly, Article I-5.2 Draft Constitution, which restates the principle of loyalty as
the principle of loyal cooperation, foresees duties of mutual assistance on the part of
Member States and the Union, thus indicating the possibility of a kind of vertical-
vertical coherence on the part of both the Union and the Member States. Of course,
what remains unclear for now is whether Article I-5.2 can be interpreted as implying
vertical-horizontal forms of coherence as well.45 It remains to see therefore how these
proposals will fare in the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) deliberations.
One last element of the proposed principle of European integrity is to be explained.
In domains where there is no European competence, integrity does not seem as relevant
at ﬁrst sight. In these cases, indeed, there are no pertinent European decisions and laws
to cohere with or no European decision or law that should demonstrate sufﬁcient
integrity. Of course, there could be national decisions from other European countries
to be cohered with, but without at least a shared European competence, it is difﬁcult
to see how there could be an argument for the existence of a European community of
principle in these cases. It is nevertheless possible to build a case for European integrity
in this context even in the absence of a directly relevant European competence. Cases
in which there is such a competence have indeed given rise to sufﬁcient laws and deci-
sions to constitute an important part of the laws that apply in the European commu-
nity, thus affecting the balance of all the laws that apply to European citizens, including
national laws. In these conditions, any national law and decision will have to cohere
with all other laws including European and national laws and decisions in other
domains and vice versa, as they might affect each other in practice. For instance, it is
not because some areas of tax law remain a national competence in the European
Union that national decisions and laws in that area can afford not to cohere with other
European and national laws and decisions in domains that overlap and which might
conﬂict with them, the reverse being true as well.
This is also what seemed to ﬂow from the October 2002 Preliminary Draft 
Constitutional Treaty and its Article 14 on the principle of coherence and continuity
European Law Journal Volume 10
264 © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2004
44 See Curtin and Dekker, op. cit. note 34 supra, at 102 for an extensive interpretation of Art 3 TEU.
45 See in this respect the most recent proposal of an adjunction of a third paragraph to Art I-5 and of a
principle of mutual loyalty between the Union’s constituent states and peoples, and hence of a kind of
vertical-horizontal coherence, in cases of European but also of national competence, in a series of
amendments to the Draft Constitution put forward by a group of academics and researchers from 
across the EU in a document entitled ‘Making it Our Own’:
<www.umich.edu/~iinet/euc/MiscHTML/EUnews.html>, accessed on 2 October 2003.
of objectives in the European Union. According to the Preliminary Draft, the princi-
ple of coherence was clearly meant to apply as much to cases in which there is an exclu-
sive or shared European competence as to cases in which Member States retain their
competence and apply them jointly. This element seems, however, to have been left out
of the most recent Draft Constitution, and in particular of Article I-18, but also of
Article I-5, which restricts the duty to loyal cooperation to the ‘carrying out of tasks
which ﬂow from the constitution’, to the ‘achievement of the Union’s tasks’, and to the
‘objectives set out in the Constitution’.46 It remains again to be seen how these pro-
posals will fare in the IGC deliberations.
In sum, it seems that the legal principle of European integrity is still very limited in
its scope and leaves a broad margin of appreciation as to how it should be implemented.
It is the aim of the next contentions in this article to determine how the proposed moral
principle of European integrity could help complement the application of the Euro-
pean legal principle of coherence as it currently exists, with respect in particular of
vertical-vertical and vertical-horizontal coherence.
B The Limits of European Integrity
Before we examine the conditions, qualiﬁcations and forms of the proposed principle
of European integrity in more detail, it is important to examine some of the principle’s
material limits, as they do not apply as stringently in the national legal context.47
First, the quantity of past European laws and decisions. The amount of decisions
and laws to be cohered with could become extremely large and also very diverse in the
European context, thus making European integrity an unattainable virtue. This is not
so much the case for integrity on the part of national authorities that have to pay respect
to European law, but it is a concern for integrity on the part of European and national
authorities that have to take into account all past national laws and decisions.48 This
concern may easily be set aside, however. The gradual strengthening of a community
of principle through integration in Europe implies that the social and cultural 
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46 See in this respect the proposal of an adjunction of a third paragraph to Art I-5 and the principle of
mutual loyalty between the Union’s constituent states and peoples, and hence of a kind of vertical-
horizontal coherence, in cases of European but also of national competence, in the amendments to the
Draft Constitution ‘Making it Our Own’: <www.umich.edu/~iinet/euc/MiscHTML/EUnews.html>,
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rights? Transnational judicial conversations on constitutional rights’, (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 499.
48 Note that in principle all European authorities have to make sure their decisions cohere with past laws
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Member State’s past laws and decisions rather than with all past national laws and decisions. However,
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general coherence with other national decisions on the same issue in Europe; otherwise, different deci-
sions would be made in different national contexts, thus endangering the coherence of the European legal
order (see S. Besson, ‘Conﬂits constitutionnels en Europe—une lecture de l’Affaire Kreil c. République
fédérale d’Allemagne’, (2000) 5 Aktuelle Juristische Praxis 563 for an illustration of this point). In fact,
the presence of national governments’ representatives in the procedure ensures that other national per-
spectives are taken into account. Thanks to Ruth Zimmerling for raising this issue in the EuroConfer-
ence in Legal Philosophy in Girona in November 2002.
diversities among Member States will tend to decrease,49 even if diversities due to value
pluralism will naturally resist.50 Moreover, integrity is a path-dependent virtue and, as
such, it will gradually increase through being respected.
Second, the complexity of European integrity. Geographical and linguistic barriers51
mean that European integrity, much more so than national integrity, is affected by time
obstacles, lack of economic means, and the limited subjective abilities of national
authorities. One way of accommodating these difﬁculties would be to reduce the level
of stringency of the principle from ‘speaking with one voice’ to ‘speaking in harmony’.
Integrity is indeed better understood as an optimisation principle. As such it should be
implemented to the highest degree possible given the circumstances.52
Third, the reciprocal nature of European integrity. It is interesting to note that since
both the national and the European sides of the European political community have
to cohere with one another’s past decisions, it is prima facie difﬁcult to see how integrity
could be a real virtue. Coherence could indeed tip the balance simultaneously in the
national direction on the part of European authorities, and in the European direction
on the part of national authorities, thus potentially inﬂuencing European decisions into
taking opposite directions. This objection may be easily discarded, however. It is
through this form of ‘double-effect’ of European integrity that European integration
can take place. By adjusting progressively to each other’s laws, active political entities
in the European Union will gradually converge and coherence should become less of
a problem. Associating European integration with a unique virtue of integrity helps to
see all authorities in all political entities in Europe as contributing to the same goal of
further integration. It also helps to dismiss the idea that only some, namely national
authorities, should be the ones integrating themselves. Of course, one may object that
this might lead to a very conservative form of European law that would not suit every-
one’s conception of what it should stand for. This critique is misleading, however.
Nothing in European integrity involves a ‘levelling-down’ or prevents innovation; all it
requires is that innovation should not depart too broadly at ﬁrst from past national
and European laws and decisions.
III The Conditions of European Integrity
For European integration to generate and then beneﬁt in return from a virtue of
integrity, there has to be a single European political and legal community whose
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Note that this concern may increase in association with the difﬁculties created by the European 
enlargement.
50 In this case too, legal choices have to be made and integrity requires that we stick to those choices. See
Raz, op. cit. note 14 supra.
51 In the European legislative context, see L. Blichner, ‘The anonymous hand of public reason: interpar-
liamentary discourse and the quest for legitimacy’, in E. O. Eriksen and J. E. Fossum (eds), Democracy
in the European Union: Integration Through Deliberation? (Routledge, 2000) 141 and V. Miller and 
R. Ware, ‘Keeping National Parliaments Informed: The Problem of European Legislation’, (1996) 2:3
The Journal of Legislative Studies 184, on the ways to guarantee the ﬂow of information between Euro-
pean and national parliaments. See also J. Habermas, ‘So Why does Europe Need a Constitution?’,
<www.iue.it/RSCAS/e-texts/CR200102UK.pdf>, accessed on 17 July 2003.
52 On this idea of optimisation, see R. Alexy, ‘On the structure of legal principles’, (2000) 13 Ratio Juris
294. On the fact that the respect of European coherence is a matter of degree, see Curtin and Dekker,
op. cit. note 34 supra, at 90.
integrity is at stake. Only such a community may then become a community of prin-
ciple by demonstrating sufﬁcient consistency in its decisions and laws. Then, only can
this community constitute the principled and respectful entity in whose name national
and European ofﬁcials are speaking when they produce laws and decisions, and with
which all European citizens associate when they obey its laws and decisions. This is a
consequence of the two arguments I presented earlier for the justiﬁcation of an inde-
pendent principle of legal integrity, i.e. the argument of public morality and the argu-
ment of authority.
This legal and political community need not, however, rely on a historically shared
and homogeneous European identity.53 It is enough, indeed, on a Kantian model, for
it to amount rather to a community constituted out of disagreement and diversity and
the corresponding need to coordinate and converge on some issues of principle. Instead
of depending on pre-existing shared fundamental understandings and beliefs, the polit-
ical and legal community will arise, on this account, out of the necessity to live together
and to deal with difference and disagreement.54 In the European context, several writers
have emphasised the heterogeneous and pluralist nature of the European identity and
community.55 This is also what ﬂows from Jürgen Habermas’ ‘constitutional patrio-
tism’.56 In a recent paper, he contends that the European community should not be
‘confused with a pre-political community of fate deriving from common origins,
language and history because this would undermine the voluntaristic character of a
contractual nation whose collective identity neither pre-dates nor can ever be seen in
isolation from the democratic processes from which it educes’.57
Nowadays there is sufﬁcient evidence of the strong community ties that characterise
the European construction.58 Founded with an aim of economic coordination, the
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53 See e.g. J. Habermas, ‘The postnational constellation and the future of democracy’, in The Postnational
Constellation—Political Essays (Polity, 2001) 58; J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: ‘Do the new
clothes have an emperor?’ and other essays on European integration (Cambridge University Press, 1999)
324; D. Grimm, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution?’, (1995) 1 European Law Journal 282.
54 See J. Waldron, ‘Cultural Identity and Civil Responsibility’, in W. Kymlicka and W. Norman (eds),
Citizenship in Diverse Societies (Oxford University Press, 2000) 155, 171 for such an account of the 
political community.
55 See Follesdal, op. cit. note 18 supra, at 105; L. Blichner and L. Sangolt, ‘The concept of subsidiarity and
the debate on European co-operation: pitfalls and possibilities’, (1994) 7:3 Governance: An International
Journal of Policy and Administration 284, 300.
56 J. Habermas, ‘Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reﬂections on the Future of Europe’, (1992) 12
Praxis international 1, 12. Note, however, that I wish to disassociate myself from Habermas’ conception
of the European monolithic and state-like demos.
57 Habermas, op. cit. note 51 supra. Curiously, Gerstenberg and Sabel (op. cit. note 19 supra) seem to think
that Habermas and Dworkin are bound to consider the European community as a pre-existing commu-
nity that cannot therefore re-create itself constantly on the basis of deliberation. The passage quoted
shows the exact contrary with respect to Habermas’ conception of the European community. As for the
critique of Dworkin’s account, it does not affect the model of integrity defended here, which is distinct
from Dworkin’s. With respect to the arguments I have been using to justify integrity, however, I think
Gerstenberg and Sabel’s critiques do not cut any ice. The point is indeed, once starting points are given,
to ﬁnd a way to subject them to constant democratic and political redeﬁnition and I think my account
as well as Dworkin’s can do that. In fact, it is one of their semantic and conceptual presuppositions that
they can. See Dworkin, op. cit. note 8 supra, at 111 and 139 on the revision of paradigms.
58 Habermas, op. cit. note 51 supra also mentions the ease with which the EU Charter of Human Rights
has been accepted as a sign of the new European ‘consciousness of community’. See also D. Curtin and
I. Dekker, ‘The Constitutional Structure of the European Union: Some Reﬂections on Vertical Unity-
in-Diversity’, in P. R. Beaumont, C. Lyons and N. Walker (eds), Convergence and Divergence in European
Public Law (Hart, 2002) 59, 71–72.
European Community has now become an even closer Union, which is grounded in
common principles and rights.59 It hence shows clear signs of political and legal con-
vergence on issues that previously divided its Member States and citizens. It may be
objected, however, that these ties amount to little more than ties between distinct polit-
ical communities and legal orders; they might not amount to the ties of principle
between individuals that are required to constitute an overall European political com-
munity or an overarching European legal order. If this were true, it would undermine
the emergence of principle and virtue of integrity in Europe.
The evidence that is usually given to counter this kind of objection is well known.60
It sufﬁces to mention the existence of autonomous European institutions, the auton-
omy of the European law-making process, the speciﬁcities of European legal interpre-
tation and legal adjudication, the primacy and direct effect of European law, and the
European majority rule to understand that the European and national legal orders are
deeply imbricated and that neither of them could be conceived without the other one
anymore. Of course, the European political and legal community is clearly not a state
in the absence of a monopoly of European coercion.61 It is not as centralised as a federal
state, since it relies on, and does not negate the distinct existence and sovereignty of
the political and legal communities of its Member States. It remains, however, more
centralised, on the face of the evidence that has just been given, than an ordinary con-
federation or international association of states.62 Its hybrid nature demonstrates, there-
fore, the existence of a sui generis overlapping European political and legal community,
which could become a true community of principle by showing sufﬁcient integrity.
European law binds all citizens of the Union in an integrated legal order. The latter
is clearly no longer derived from the international legal order and hence it is neither
subordinated nor superior to the national legal order in a monistic and hierarchical
conceptualisation of the relations between the European and national legal orders. Nor
is it totally independent from national legal orders, contrary to dualist conceptions of
their relations. The European legal order stricto sensu and the national European legal
orders are united in a broader and overarching pluralist but interdependent legal order.
Direct ties of both obedience and legitimisation between European citizens who are
also national citizens, on the one hand, and this overlapping European legal order, on
the other, conﬁrm the latter’s communal nature. As a consequence, national and Euro-
pean authorities alike are part of the complex set of authorities, which create and inter-
pret European law and apply it to European citizens.
True, as Andreas Follesdal argues, ‘the task of generating and maintaining the 
requisite trans-European values and commitments is a daunting challenge’.63 European
integrity, however, could be the virtue of an integrated but diverse European commu-
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tion between ‘community’ and ‘unity’ in Europe.
60 See C. Richmond, ‘Preserving the identity crisis: autonomy, system and sovereignty in European law’,
(1997) 16 Law and Philosophy 377; J. Weiler and U. Haltern, ‘The Autonomy of the Community Legal
Order: Through the Looking Glass’, (1996) 37 Harvard Journal of International Law 411; N. Mac-
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61 See A. von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as a Supranational Federation: A Conceptual Attempt in
the light of the Amsterdam Treaty’, (2000) 6 Columbia Journal of European Law 27.
62 See P. Magnette, L’Europe, l’Etat et la Démocratie (Editions complexe, 2000) 139 ff. on the hybrid nature
of European federalism between traditional federalism and confederalism. See also J. H. H. Weiler,
‘A Constitution for Europe? Some Hard Choices’, (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 563.
63 Follesdal, op. cit. note 18 supra, at 106. See also Weiler, 1990–1991, op. cit. note 20 supra, at 2479.
nity of principle. It could help generate and maintain trans-European values and com-
mitments by insisting on European coherence and the constitution of a European polit-
ical community in circumstances of disagreement, but without artiﬁcially imposing that
coherence from a centralised European perspective and without jeopardising the impor-
tance of subsidiarity considerations. Integrity could therefore be said to be both a way
to deal with European disagreement in speaking with a harmonious voice, on the one
hand, and a way to make the most out of it without necessarily replacing the diversity
of views by a uniﬁed voice, on the other.64
IV The Obstacles to European Integrity
Because the virtue of European integrity calls for transnational and supranational
coherence, it raises interesting but difﬁcult issues with respect to sovereignty, on the one
hand, and authority, on the other. These questions are two conceptually distinctive sides
of the same coin, which are worth distinguishing with respect to integrity.
A European Integrity and Sovereignty
Not all cases in which European integrity is respected will raise issues of sovereignty.
Some areas of European law are indeed now organised in such a way that European
and national authorities are quite content with the allocation of powers and compe-
tence between the European and the national levels. Things are rarely that evident,
however. Given the crucial role of national authorities in implementing and interpret-
ing European law and objectives, sovereignty can no longer be clearly located in all
cases of European competence. Besides, the higher one goes in the hierarchy of com-
petence in each political entity, the more difﬁcult it is for national authorities to cope
with a concurring or shared European competence. Lastly, another area of difﬁculty is
the strictly transnational application of the principle of European integrity, as compe-
tence and powers are jointly exercised by Member States in those cases. This difﬁculty
will actually even increase in the future given the more and more differentiated nature
of European integration.65
All this is hardly surprising given that, in ﬁfty years, the economic integration project
has turned into a political construction whose nature is still indeterminate and unprece-
dented in political history.66 Different degrees of cooperation are now in place between
Member States and the Union, which do not correspond to any of the previously
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Gerstenberg, 2002a and 2002b, op. cit. note 19 supra.
known political categories.67 The difﬁculty is that neither the Treaties nor European
practice do, or perhaps should entail a precise division of powers, and this trend has
not been reversed by the CFE’s Draft Constitution despite important clariﬁcations in
Article I-10.1 (ﬁrst explicit statement of the primacy clause68) and in Articles I-11 to 
I-17.69 Moreover, both the Union and the Member States have adopted very clear posi-
tions on the issue of the primacy of European law, but their perspectives do not cor-
respond to each other. Each legal order regards its own sovereignty as absolute, original
and supreme, and the other’s as relative and derivative.70
If authorities are to consider other European authorities’ decisions when they take
their own and have to make sure that they cohere in order for the European legal com-
munity to speak with one voice, then it would become an important obstacle if they
felt that they are thereby losing their sovereignty. The problem is that often sovereignty
is understood in a very basic way as the power to have the last word on speciﬁc issues.
Given the pluralist nature of the European legal order lato sensu, the different author-
ities in charge are not subordinated to one another. It is necessary therefore to ﬁnd a
way to reconcile European political authorities’ sovereignty with their motivation to
belong to a European community of principle in re-conceptualising sovereignty in
Europe.
To start with, the clashes of sovereignties I have just been describing should not be
taken, in a ‘winner-takes-all’ manner, to mean that either the Member States or the
European Union retain original sovereignty.71 This does not mean, however, that sov-
ereignty should be pooled or divided as some suggest it should, since this would empty
the concept of sovereignty from any meaningful implications.72 Nor does it have to
mean that sovereignty is lost and that we have moved beyond sovereignty, since we
clearly look for and need a ﬁnal umpire in most political circumstances.73 All it reveals
is that paradigms of sovereignty have changed and that new conceptions have emerged
which conﬂict with prior ones, thus conﬁrming the essentially contestable nature of the
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European Integration: The Weight of Legal Tradition’, in A.-M. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet and J. Weiler
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73 Contra: MacCormick, op. cit. note 16 supra, and N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty, (Oxford 
University Press, 1999).
concept of sovereignty.74 As Neil Walker rightly notes, the concept of sovereignty has
sufﬁcient scope to accommodate a multi-dimensional conception of sovereignty.75
Of course, it is possible to go beyond mere disagreement on these conceptions of
sovereignty76 and to choose one of them that would ﬁt current paradigms in Europe.
For instance, sovereignty could very well be conceived as plural along the lines of a
cooperative model of sovereignty.77 This approach of sovereignty, which corresponds to
the concept’s contestable nature, also mirrors the cooperative dimension that has
recently characterised international relations between interdependent and so-called
‘open’ states.78 When understood in this cooperative way, sovereignty amounts to a
reﬂective and dynamic concept.
First, it is reﬂective as it creates a constant questioning of the allocation of power,
thus putting into question others’ sovereignty as well as one’s own. Read together with
subsidiarity, cooperative sovereignty may require a centralisation or even a decentrali-
sation of competence depending on the circumstances. In each case, the decision to
cooperate or not is sovereign. and subsidiarity does not look as antithetical to sover-
eignty as it is sometimes made to. Although the exercise of cooperative sovereignty is
divided, sovereignty itself is not diminished. On the contrary, its cooperative dimen-
sion makes it stronger thanks to its concerted or polycentred exercise. This is what some
authors refer to as polyarchy.79
Second, the exercise of sovereignty is dynamic as it implies a search for the best allo-
cation of power in each case and by all the sovereign authorities affected.80 This
common exercise of political sovereignty is then reﬂected in the structure of the rela-
tionship between the different legal orders at stake; none of them is ultimately and
entirely submitted to another. This reality is what many nowadays refer to as legal plu-
ralism.81 This kind of legal cooperation reveals the possibility of a non-hierarchically
organised plurality of legal orders, which may individually remain hierarchical in their
internal structure or in their relationship to international law,82 but which relate to one
another in a heterarchical way.83
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It should be clear by now how the cooperative conception of sovereignty may allow
for integrity to become a truly sovereign virtue in the European political and legal com-
munity. As sovereignty is not undermined by being cooperative and as its exercise
requires looking for the best way to ensure the values it protects, all European and
national authorities would beneﬁt from examining, comparing, and cohering with past
decisions and laws of other European and national authorities. Integrity could thus
become the virtue of Europeans’ integrated sovereignty, i.e. the virtue of a community
that wants to integrate itself without, however, renouncing to diversity and hence to
pluralism.
B European Integrity and Authority
A second preliminary obstacle that should be addressed before we look at the princi-
ple of European integrity in more detail is the question of authority. By authority I
mean the capacity of laws and decisions to bind, in order to distinguish it from the
other side of the same coin, which is constituted by sovereignty.84
Whereas the authority of European laws and decisions in Member States is clearly
given, the reverse is not necessarily true. It is even more difﬁcult in the case of transna-
tional relations of integrity among European Member States. Integrity requires that
the authorities to which it applies take European or foreign national decisions into
account when they decide. True, they are not bound to apply them as valid law, but
they are expected to be inspired by them since they should make their decisions cohere
with them. This is enough to trigger an authority-based problem for European integrity,
since in a pluralist legal order such as the European legal order lato sensu, the differ-
ent authorities in charge are not subordinated to one another and, strictly speaking,
do not therefore have authority over one another.
This difﬁculty is at ﬁrst sight paradoxical since the principle of integrity was ﬁrst jus-
tiﬁed in this essay by reference to authority. Indeed, it was contended earlier that, in
order for the recipients of legal decisions to be able to feel bound by them, they should
be able to have been their authors and this is only possible if the law demonstrates
integrity and speaks with one voice. The type of authority at stake in this justiﬁcation
of integrity is, however, the authority of the decision that coheres with others, in rela-
tion to its recipients, i.e. European citizens. By contrast, the issue at stake in this section
is the authority of the other decisions with which the decision should cohere, in rela-
tion to the authorities in charge of making the decision. An illustration might help to
understand the difﬁculty.85 Let us imagine, for instance, that the Court of Justice of the
European Communities might feel that it is not bound by German constitutional prin-
ciples when applying a European Directive on equality. The German citizen, however,
to whom the Court of Justice’s decision and the German constitutional principles apply
equally will not be able to feel she is the author of all the laws that allegedly bind her
before they are made to cohere, thus requiring that the Court of Justice solves its
authority-based problem and ensures that its decisions cohere with German constitu-
tional principles.
The difﬁculty is not as insoluble as it ﬁrst appears. First, there is a sense in which the
authority of the decisions that are to be cohered with is only ancillary to the authority
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of the decisions by which citizens are bound. It is indeed part of the rules that bind
authorities that they should make rules that can bind citizens. As such, they should also
be able to be the authors of all laws that apply to citizens and this transforms into an
authoritative directive whatever can make them true authors of a coherent set of laws.
Second, there is an important difference of degree between the way in which a person is
bound by a law qua citizen and the way in which she is bound qua judge or ofﬁcial. In
the latter case, the obligation to abide may be much more tenuous and one speaks some-
times of ‘persuasive authority’.86 It is sufﬁcient, indeed, that the decisions in question
constitute a potential solution rather than a binding one as in the former case.
V The Forms of European Integrity
There can be two main forms of European integrity depending on which authorities
are bound by it: integrity among Member States and the European Union, on the one
hand, and integrity among Member States, on the other. This distinction corresponds
to the opposition I drew earlier between vertical-vertical or supranational integrity and
vertical-horizontal or transnational integrity.
A Integrity among Member States and the European Union
In order to grasp the importance of this main form of integrity in the European
context, it is useful to distinguish cases in which national authorities are bound by
integrity from those cases in which European authorities are.
a) Integrity on the Part of National Authorities
The least controversial case of European integrity is its application to national author-
ities. National laws and decisions that fall broadly within European domains of com-
petence become part of a global set of laws and decisions, i.e. the laws and decisions
of the European community that apply to all European citizens. Hence the requirement
to speak with a single or at least harmonious voice with European laws and decisions.87
This applies as much to coherence on the part of national laws and decisions, which,
strictly speaking, implement or interpret European law as to coherence on the part of
those national laws and decisions that implement a national competence but which
affect or may be affected by European laws and decisions.
Most national authorities in Europe have tended in practice to cohere willingly in
their decisions with European past laws and decisions. Cooperation on the part of
national authorities in the translation, the enforcement, and the interpretation of Euro-
pean law in national law is facilitated in some cases where European procedures and
institutions enable national authorities to ask for advice on particular questions. This
is the case, for instance, of the possibility to apply for a preliminary ruling on a par-
ticular issue given by Article 234 of the consolidated version of the Treaty establishing
the European Community. In practice, however, the growth in European litigation and
the time constraints on national adjudication have led to an increase in national 
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decisions on these matters. National authorities should therefore ensure consistency in
principle with other European laws and decisions on their own, when they take this
kind of decision. One should note in this respect that the increase in the national 
competence of adjudication over the interpretation of European law also implies a
heightened need for vertical-horizontal integrity among national decisions in the 
implementation and interpretation of European law, as we will see.
b) Integrity on the Part of European Authorities
If one wants to go up one rung in the ladder of controversy regarding the principle of
European integrity, the next stage is to assess integrity as a virtue of European author-
ities. According to European integrity, European authorities should render decisions
that cohere with their own past laws and decisions, but also with the decisions and laws
of Member States’ authorities.
In practice, European authorities have been quite inclined to ensure coherence
between their own decisions and national decisions. It has been the case for many Court
of Justice decisions on controversial constitutional and human rights issues. The Court
of Justice decided in these cases to take into account national guarantees of human
rights in a mutual dialogue with its national counterparts and hence to cohere with
national positions rather than rule in isolation and at the price of integrity.88 This ten-
dency reveals the consciousness on the part of European authorities that they are
speaking in the name of the European political community as a whole rather than just
in their own name. This applies as much to coherence with national laws and decisions
that implement or interpret European laws and decisions, as to coherence with those
national laws and decisions which, strictly speaking, implement a national competence
but affect or can be affected by European laws and decisions.
B Integrity among Member States
Integrity among Member States is mostly encountered in a national setting, but one
should also mention the instances of vertical-horizontal integrity that take place in a
European setting.
a) Integrity on the Part of National Authorities in a National Setting
One of the most controversial cases of application of European integrity is the case of
integrity among Member States’ authorities. According to this variant of the principle,
authorities in Member States should not only make their decisions cohere with their
own past decisions and laws, but also with the decisions of other national authorities
in the European Union. This applies of course mostly to decisions of interpretation
and implementation of European law in national law, but also in some cases to other
national laws and decisions.
The difﬁculty is to establish a sufﬁcient link between these national decisions and the
European community of principle that called for integrity in the other two cases dis-
cussed before. The problem is not as intractable as it ﬁrst seems, however. Transnational
cross-fertilisation, both in adjudication and legislation, is a widespread phenomenon.89
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True, it does not apply universally, but in communities of countries that feel bound by
common principles and rules. Belonging to the European Union has motivated many
European countries to borrow rules in other European countries and, more generally,
to cohere in the decisions that have relevance for the European political community as
a whole.90 This is particularly important now that, as we saw earlier, national authori-
ties are those mainly in charge of controlling the European conformity of national laws,
and are thus also contributing to the construction of the European legal order.
Transnational integrity not only applies to cases in which national authorities inter-
pret and implement European law, but also to other areas of national competence.
Some national laws are indeed bound to affect the implementation of other European
laws or may affect the way these areas might one day be europeanised in the country
in question but also in others.91 Support for transnational integrity may also be found
in the evolving practice of ‘mutual recognition’ of national regulations and the attempt
to overcome market fragmentation resulting from differing national standards when
there is no European competence.92
In sum, although this transnational form of European integrity remains relatively
rare in practice among authorities, as opposed to litigants or defendants, there are no
obstacles in principle to its implementation.93 It is therefore, as Miguel Poiares Maduro
rightly argues, a matter of conviction and reform in the process of European law-
making to further its implementation in the future.94 This should be strongly encour-
aged given the crucial role transnational coherence and cooperation, rather than
top-down or even bottom-up approaches, can play in constituting a pluralist albeit
common European identity and citizenship.
b) Integrity on the Part of National Authorities in a European Setting: the Case
of the OMC
European integrity may also apply between Member States in the context of the
increasingly prevalent ‘Open Method of Co-ordination’ (OMC).95 This procedure aims
at addressing problems created by European integration in Member States.96 OMC is
in essence a form of community-based control as between Member States.97
There are many ways of implementing this procedure, but one of the most promis-
ing ones puts the emphasis on national authorities’ decisions. These have to focus on
a common problem and to consider their own policy choices in relation to this problem
by comparison to other Member States’ choices. In this account of OMC, integrity can
obviously play a crucial role as it would ensure the very form of European institutional
coherence among Member States the procedure aims at obtaining: mutual correction
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and consistency, but not uniformity.98 Not only should Member States try to demon-
strate the effectiveness of nationally divergent solutions in comparative analysis, but
they should also aim at establishing that these solutions ‘integrate common European
concerns’.99 European integrity in this context also implies integrity with other Member
States’ decisions with which they are compared in respect of their integrity with Euro-
pean law.
In fact, European integrity in the OMC context might even be a way to redeem the
latter’s democratic legitimacy100 in a space devoid of legal constraints apart from the
Treaty itself.101 Integrity will indeed lead Member States’ authorities to account for their
decisions a second time at the national level through the publicity gained at the Euro-
pean level, as well as to account for them before the European authorities which take
part to the OMC. More importantly, it will constrain Member States’ authorities to
account to each other for the lack of European coherence of their decisions overall,
thus generating a form of transnational democratic practice in Europe. This could in
turn contribute to the emergence of a truly European public sphere that may more 
generally enhance democratic legitimacy at the European level.102 This form of
democratic coordination across political and legal sub-communities, that supplements
democratic decisions taken in the separate units, is characteristic of the new form of
democracy some authors hope for in the European Union: deliberative polyarchy.103
In a nutshell, when European integrity among Member States is applied through the
OMC, it protects, on the one hand, the importance of diversity and context-sensitivity
in European law by allowing Member States a broad margin of appreciation, and, on
the other, the importance of the search for a common approach that shapes Member
States’ decisions. This form of integrity may therefore well become a vehicle for further
constitutionalisation of the EU thanks to an enterprise of transnational legal coher-
ence among Member States’ authorities.104
VI The Relevance of European Integrity: Three Illustrations
As may be deduced from the title of this paper, European integrity is one of the out-
comes of European integration, but it has also become one of its necessary require-
ments. The process of European integration that contributed to the constitution of a
European community of principle, and hence to the emergence of the principle of
integrity, has generally weakened, despite numerous recent attempts to boost it through
the European enlargement and constitutionalisation processes. There are different
reasons for this, but one may want to mention the legitimacy crisis caused in part by
the extension of judicial powers, the alleged democratic deﬁcit of the European deci-
sionmaking process, and the lack of sufﬁcient constitutional guarantees at the Euro-
pean level.
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It is in those very areas of difﬁculty that a strong principle of integrity can contribute
to the re-constitution of a community of principle in the European Union and hence
to a new phase in European integration. Integrity could then become a truly integra-
tive virtue, i.e. the virtue of a community that aims at integrating itself as much as pos-
sible in areas of European competence without neglecting its own diversity. Not only
could European integrity amount to a good way of dealing with constitutional con-
ﬂicts in European adjudication, ﬁrst of all, but, second, it could also provide the incen-
tive for more intense interparliamentary cooperation. Lastly, integrity could also
stimulate European constitutionalism qua process of mutual discovery and learning
among European Member States. All three difﬁculties have been addressed to some
extent in the deliberations surrounding the adoption of the Draft Constitution, but
European integrity can still make a crucial difference in the area.
A European Integrity and Constitutional Conﬂicts: Integrity in Adjudication
Constitutional conﬂicts are conﬂicts between national and European jurisdictional
authorities, which all claim to have the ﬁnal say in constitutional matters in their own
legal orders. Such conﬂicts arise more and more frequently in the European context,
even more so since the dominant conception of the relations between European legal
orders has become a pluralist and heterarchical one.105 Different ways to solve these
conﬂicts have been brought forward over the past few years and they include dialogue106
or international/supra-European modes of legal settlement.107
Constitutional conﬂicts raise issues of integrity as they usually lead to either side of
the conﬂict deciding on the primacy of its constitutional rules and principles without
any further regard for the other side’s law, thus importing an element of incoherence
into the global set of laws that apply to European citizens. Of course, it is natural that,
on both sides of the debate, jurisdictions examine the validity of laws they are bound
to apply.108 The fear of conﬂicts and the lack of clear rules on the matter should not
lead to the conclusion that controls of constitutionality have no place at all in the Euro-
pean construction process.109 The question is rather to know what type of control
should apply and what its modalities should be.
The principle of European integrity might offer a way out of the deadlock. It follows
indeed from what has been said about cooperative sovereignty in the European Union
that constitutionality controls, either on the European or the national sides, should be
seen as cooperative and reﬂective.110 National and European jurisdictions cannot afford
to work separately and with no regard whatsoever for the other side’s constitutional
rules. This is what Mattias Kumm calls the ‘common constitutional approach’.111 One
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may even go further than these mere requirements of dialogue and mutual respect.
Indeed, on the basis of what has been said about integrity being one of the principles
underlying the exercise of reﬂective sovereignty in Europe, one could add that both
national and European courts should do more than merely pay attention to their
mutual decisions on these issues. They should also try to speak in harmony with each
other.
According to the integrity-based model of constitutional control defended here,
adjudication in Europe could therefore be much more respectful of other authorities’
laws and decisions and coherent than it is usually said to be. Most principles and values
that are protected on each side are common to all European constitutional instruments.
Thus, disagreement about the best way to realise them enhances the need for coopera-
tion and coherence in protecting them in each jurisdiction. This model of constitutional
control builds upon judicial conversation,112 but goes further than what is usually
understood by these terms, as it results in true cooperative constitutional control. This
may be done mainly through a form of mutual or reciprocal interpretation and justi-
ﬁcation.113 One sometimes also speaks of a ‘polycentered mode of judicial decision-
making’.114 This willingness to further European integrity on the part of all parties to
constitutional conﬂicts should be warmly encouraged.115 One of its many advantages
could be to reduce the amount of distrust that has characterised the relationship
between national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice in recent years.116
B European Integrity and Interparliamentary Discourse: Integrity in
Legislation
Another area where the principle of European integrity could provide the means for a
strong community of principle to establish itself is European legislation. Integrity in
legislation could apply among national parliaments, on the one hand, or between
national parliaments and the European Parliament, on the other.
The importance of dialogue between parliaments throughout Europe has been
emphasised a lot in recent years, both at the national and European levels.117 A Proto-
col to the Amsterdam Treaty actually gives a formal status to the principle of inter-
parliamentary cooperation. More recently, a Protocol of the CFE’s Draft Constitution
establishes a series of measures to strengthen the involvement of national parliaments
in EU decision-making that include, for instance, a duty to inform national parliaments,
a common code of conduct, and an early warning mechanism in case of non-
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. The beneﬁts of interparliamentary delib-
eration and the creation of a European parliamentary public sphere are clear in terms
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of the enhancement of the democratic legitimacy of European decisions.118 However,
another principle is also at stake here: European integrity. Once information has been
exchanged, one could argue that the legislative outcome itself, be it national or Euro-
pean, should be affected and be required to speak with a Euro-coherent voice.
Lars Blichner contends that ‘interparliamentary discussions may be seen as a way of
institutionalising self-reﬂectivity on the parliament’s own decisions’.119 One may go
further and contend that, through interparliamentary dialogue, national and European
legislatures gradually conceptualise the European political and legal community they
belong to. Once this idea of contributing to the constitution of the European commu-
nity is accepted, it is difﬁcult to see how the reﬂective requirement to compare and
cohere with other national and European decisions may be discarded. Rather than con-
ceptualising their own national identity with respect to a broader European one, on the
one hand, and their communal European identity, on the other, in isolated ways,
members of national parliaments should conceptualise them together as it is only then
that they will belong to a true political community.
This transnational legislative dialogue and mutual comparison could in turn add
onto national standards of democratic legitimacy and hence contribute to enhancing
the democratic quality of national legislation.120 National decisions in Europe are
increasingly affected by European, but also by other national decisions in the drafting
of which all those subject to them have not had democratic representation. Interpar-
liamentary cooperation may help compensate these national and European democra-
tic deﬁcits. Moreover, the application of the principle of European integrity to
European legislature could help alleviating the democratic deﬁcit that plagues Euro-
pean Parliament’s legislation. In some estimates, indeed, the implementation of legis-
lation taken in Brussels already makes up 70% of all national legislation, whereas this
legislation is hardly ever exposed to political debate in national arenas.121 Bound by the
principle of integrity, the European Parliament would not only have to examine
national legislation, but also to make sure that its legislation coheres with it.
C European Integrity and Constitutionalism qua Process: Integrity in
Constitutionalisation
The principle of integrity could also play a role for European constitutionalism qua
process,122 i.e. the process of constitutionalisation of the European Union which started
ﬁfty years ago and the outcome of which is currently being reorganised.123 This process
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is a cross-disciplinary and cross-institutional one, as it implies different types of author-
ities in different legal ﬁelds that have a constitutional effect in a broad sense of the
term.124 Not only are there many different European authorities involved, but the
process amounts to the gradual constitution of the European political community as
a whole and as such it involves all those authorities in a position to produce constitu-
tional rules and decisions that apply to European citizens.125 This is also what the idea
of constitutional pluralism aims at capturing.126
In these conditions, European integrity would constitute a form of European consti-
tutional discipline as it would work as the constituting and hence constitutionalising
principle. In all areas and cases discussed in this article, all national and European
authorities would be reminded by the principle of integrity that they are contributing
to the gradual constitution or even to the re-constitution of Europe. They would there-
fore have to test their decisions for coherence against other European and national con-
stitutional standards before taking them.
Of course, this form of constitutional discipline should not be interpreted as a way
to disavow the CFE’s Draft Constitution, nor the outcomes of the 2004 IGC. It cor-
responds more closely, however, to the nature of the European community and the 
ﬂexible way in which it has gradually constituted itself in ﬁfty years of integration. In
respecting integrity, European constitutionalism qua process promotes the very ideals
of tolerance and cooperation Joseph Weiler associates with the European constitu-
tion.127 This process should not therefore be discarded once a formal European Con-
stitution has been entrenched. It should on the contrary be reinforced by current
constitutional discussions and the new constitutional fora, which have been created by
or have emerged in the wake of the CFE.128 It is important as a consequence to prevent
the potential chilling effect the adoption of a formal and uniﬁed European Constitu-
tion could have on the existing transnational dialogue and constitutional process.129 To
do so, we should actively foster the cooperative attitude among national and European
authorities that has been triggered by the European ‘constitutional moment’, whatever
that moment really amounted to.130
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Conclusion
European law should speak with just one voice, or so it seems by the end of this article.
The laws of the European community in a broad sense can only hope to gain true 
legitimacy and authority in the eyes of all European citizens if they show respect for
diverging but reasonable conceptions of what it should do.131 This can only be done 
if all national and European authorities speak as an integrated entity and with respect
to all parts of the law that applies to individuals in Europe.
In fact, the principle of integrity has become even more relevant now that European
communal ties are under scrutiny in terms of institutional, democratic, and constitu-
tional legitimacy and that the European Union has been enlarged to integrate new
members. Integrity should be conceived as a constructive approach to dealing with the
growing pressure for European solutions under conditions of increasing politically
salient diversity. In these circumstances, integrity constitutes the ideal instrument for a
pluralist and ﬂexible further constitutionalisation of the European Union.
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